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Abstract 
 
Many governments try to stabilize commodity prices based on the widespread 
belief that households value price stability and that the poor especially benefit 
from food price stabilization. We derive an exact measure of multivariate price 
risk aversion and of associated household willingness to pay for price stabilization 
across multiple commodities. Using data from a panel of Ethiopian households, 
we estimate that the average household would be willing to pay 6-32 percent of its 
income to eliminate fluctuations in the prices of the seven primary food 
commodities. But not everyone benefits from price stabilization. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the welfare gains from eliminating price fluctuations would 
be concentrated in the upper 40 percent of the income distribution, making food 
price stabilization a distributionally regressive policy in this context. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: D13, D80, E64, O12, Q12 
Keywords: Price Fluctuations, Price Stabilization, Price Risk, Risk and 
Uncertainty. 
 
                                                 
* We thank Zack Brown and Pascale Schnitzer for excellent research assistance as well as Stefan Dercon, 
and Vivian Hoffman for additional help with the data. We also thank Zack Brown, Phil Cook, Bob Myers, 
and Wally Thurman as well as seminar audiences at Leuven, Michigan State, Namur, North Carolina State, 
Ottawa, Paris, Tennessee, Texas A&M, Toulouse, and Western Michigan and conference participants at the 
2008 Southern Economics Association meetings and the 2009 SCC-76 “Economics and Management of 
Risk in Agriculture and Natural Resources” for useful comments and suggestions. Part of this paper was 
written while Bellemare was visiting the University of Namur, whose generous financial support he would 
like to acknowledge. All remaining errors are ours. 
1
 Corresponding Author and Assistant Professor, Duke University, Box 90312, Durham, NC 27708-0312, 
(919) 613-9382, marc.bellemare@duke.edu. 
2
 Stephen B. and Janice G. Ashley Professor of Applied Economics and International Professor, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7801, (607) 255-4489, cbb2@cornell.edu. 
3
 Associate Professor, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7801, (607) 255-2086, drj3@cornell.edu. 
 1
1. Introduction 
How do commodity price fluctuations affect the welfare of individuals and households in 
developing countries? And when governments intervene to stabilize commodity prices, 
who benefits and who suffers? Such questions arise because, throughout history and all 
over the world, governments have frequently treated commodity price stability as an 
important goal of economic policy. Using a host of policy instruments, from buffer stocks 
to administrative pricing and from variable tariffs to marketing boards, governments have 
tried to stabilize prices. These efforts have typically met with, at best, only very limited 
success. As a result, price stabilization fell off the policy agenda by the early 1990s.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, however, commodity prices have been on a roller coaster ride 
(Cashin and McDermott, 2002; Jacks et al., 2009), as food price 10-year volatility 
reached its highest level in almost 30 years in 2009 (Roache, 2010). Market volatility 
over the past decade or so, punctuated by the food crisis of 2007-2008 and the biggest 
one-month jump in wheat prices in more than three decades, in summer 2010, has 
rekindled widespread popular interest in commodity price stabilization. A simple 
literature search finds more than five times as many media articles on the topic in the past 
five years as in the preceding five years.4 Even the World Bank’s flagship World 
Development Report (World Bank, 2008, pp.121-122) discusses various policy options 
for price stabilization. 
 
The political impulse toward state interventions to stabilize domestic food prices 
commonly arises because (i) households are widely believed to value price stability; (ii) 
the poor are widely perceived to suffer disproportionately from food price instability; and 
(iii) futures and options markets for hedging against food price risk are commonly 
inaccessible to consumers and poor producers in developing countries (Newbery, 1989; 
Timmer, 1989). Given the policy importance of the topic, and although economists have 
commonly questioned the net economic benefit of government price stabilization 
interventions (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Krueger et al., 1988; Knudsen and Nash, 
                                                 
4
 An August 13, 2010, LexisNexis search turned up just 51 articles, 2000-2005, on “commodity price 
stabilization,” or variants replacing “commodity” with “food” or “stabilization” with “stability” or 
“volatility”, but 266 articles on the same search terms over the (slightly shorter) 2006-10 period. 
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1990), it is puzzling that the theoretical and empirical toolkits available to economists for 
understanding the relationship between price fluctuations – what we will also refer to as 
“price risk” in this paper – and household welfare is both dated and limited. Although 
few experts would dispute claim (iii), rigorous, convincing empirical tests of claims (i) 
and (ii) are noticeably absent from the published literature. Indeed, up to this point there 
was not an established theory and empirical method for conducting such tests. 
 
In this paper, we address that gap by studying whether (i) households value price 
stability; and (ii) the poor suffer disproportionately from food price instability. The 
effects of price fluctuations on producer behavior and welfare have been well-explored in 
the theoretical literature. Output price uncertainty generally causes firms to employ fewer 
inputs, foregoing expected profits in order to hedge against price fluctuations (Baron, 
1970; Sandmo, 1971). The analysis of commodity price fluctuations has been extended 
theoretically to individual consumers (Deschamps, 1973; Hanoch, 1977; Turnovsky et al., 
1980; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Newbery, 1989), who are generally thought to be price 
risk-loving given the quasiconvexity of the indirect utility function. Because agricultural 
households can be both producers as well as consumers of the same commodities, 
however, it is entirely possible for some households to be price risk-averse, for others to 
be price risk-neutral, and for yet others to be price risk-loving (Finkelshtain and Chalfant 
1991, 1997; Barrett, 1996), although prior empirical analyses have focused on just a 
single commodity. Although Turnovsky et al. (1980) considered the price fluctuations of 
multiple commodities, they did so only theoretically. But given that indirect utility 
functions – the usual measure of welfare in microeconomic theory – are defined over 
both income and a vector of prices, the literature’s heavy focus on income risk, extended 
at most to a single stochastic price, paints a very incomplete picture of total (i.e., income 
and prices) attitudes toward risk and the impacts thereof. The literature is not very useful 
for informing the growing popular debates that surround food price stabilization policies. 
 
In order to study whether households value multi-commodity price stability and 
whether the poor suffer disproportionately from food price instability, we combine the 
theoretical framework of Turnovsky et al. (1980) with the empirical framework 
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developed by Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991, 1997) and extended by Barrett (1996). 
This allows us to derive an exact measure of multivariate price risk aversion – more 
precisely, an estimable matrix of price risk aversion over multiple commodities – and its 
associated willingness to pay (WTP) measures for price stabilization. We then apply this 
measure to estimate the heterogeneous welfare effects of food price volatility among rural 
Ethiopian households who both produce and consume several commodities characterized 
by stochastic prices. Indeed, using the standard deviation—mean ratio (i.e., a measure 
which, for each price, expresses the standard deviation as a percentage of the mean) for 
each commodity price retained for analysis in this paper as a rough measure of the 
importance of price fluctuations, the lowest (highest) such ratio is equal to 14 percent (33 
percent). Intuitively, this means that in our data, the least variable price will on average 
rise or fall by one seventh, and the most variable price will on average rise or fall by one 
third. 
 
Each element of the matrix of price risk aversion coefficients we derive and estimate 
reflects the risk premium associated with the covariance between two prices faced by the 
household. On the diagonal, this yields familiar own-price risk aversion coefficients 
(Barrett 1996). These measure the direct impacts on welfare of the fluctuations in each 
price, i.e., the impact on welfare of the variance of each price, holding everything else 
constant. But because a price almost never fluctuates alone given that different 
commodities are typically substitutes for or complements to one another, the off-diagonal 
elements of the matrix of price risk aversion measure the indirect impacts on welfare of 
the fluctuations in a each price, i.e., the impacts on welfare of the covariance between a 
given price and the prices of all the other commodities considered, holding everything 
else constant. Of course, the indirect welfare impact of the covariance between the price 
of one commodity and the price of another must be symmetric. The symmetry implied by 
the theory offers a convenient test of the core microeconomic behavioral assumptions.  
 
To obtain the total welfare impacts of price vector fluctuations, one thus needs to 
consider both (i) the variance in each commodity price series as well as (ii) the 
covariances among them. Ignoring the covariances between prices leads to a biased 
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estimate of the total welfare impact of price vector fluctuations unless the very strong 
assumption that commodities are neither complements nor substitutes holds, although the 
sign of the bias is impossible to determine ex ante. The off-diagonal terms (i.e., the 
indirect effects of price risk, or price covariance effects) of the matrix of price risk 
aversion have so far been ignored by applied economists. Our analysis is the first to 
quantify their importance relative to the diagonal terms (i.e., the direct effects of price 
risk, or price variance effects) of the matrix of price risk aversion. 
 
Based on the matrix of price risk aversion coefficients, we further show how to derive 
the household’s WTP to stabilize at their means the prices of a set of commodities. Using 
panel data from rural Ethiopian households, we then estimate these measures, finding that 
the average household is willing to give up 6-32 percent of its income to stabilize the 
price of the seven most important food commodities. Nonparametric analysis further 
suggests that in these data, contrary to conventional wisdom, the welfare gains of price 
stabilization are concentrated among the upper 40 percent of the income distribution, 
while more than 30 percent of the (poorer) population would suffer statistically 
significant losses from price stabilization, although the magnitude of per capita losses 
among the latter subpopulation is much smaller than the magnitude of estimated gains 
among the wealthier winners. Hence the average net gains, as wealthier households who 
are largely net sellers of these food commodities benefit at the expense of poorer, largely 
net buyers. Given the strong political pressures to tackle food price volatility, we 
conclude with a simple thought experiment. We show that an alternative to strict price 
stabilization policy, one in which the households who are price risk-averse receive a 
transfer payment to compensate them for the loss they suffer due to price risk exposure, 
but which leaves households who benefit from price fluctuations unaffected, may be 
Pareto superior to fixing prices.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Based on the theoretical work of 
Turnovsky et al. (1980), we extend Barrett’s (1996) empirical approach to the estimation 
of price risk aversion coefficients to the multiple commodity case in section 2. In section 
3, we present the data and descriptive statistics. We then develop a reduced form 
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empirical framework to estimate the matrix of price risk aversion coefficients and discuss 
identification in section 4. In section 5 we estimate own- and cross-price risk aversion 
coefficients, test the symmetry restrictions of the theory, compute and analyze household 
WTP estimates for price stabilization, and casually explore a price risk compensation 
scheme as an alternative to pure price stabilization policy. We conclude in section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
This section develops a simple two-period agricultural household model (AHM) and 
derives the household’s matrix of price risk aversion coefficients. This is the most 
parsimonious model possible, as we need a framework that encompasses both consumer 
and producer behavior while an interest in price instability requires, at a minimum, a two 
period model, with at least one period in which agents make decisions subject to 
uncertainty with respect to prices, both in levels and in relation to incomes and other 
prices.5 After deriving the household’s price risk aversion matrix, we show that it is 
symmetric – an implication which we test for in section 5 – and relate it to the Slutsky 
matrix. Lastly, we analytically derive measures of household willingness to pay to 
stabilize the prices of one or more commodities, which allow quantifying the welfare 
impacts of price fluctuations in section 5. 
 
2.1. Agricultural Household Model 
The derivations in this section closely follow those in Barrett (1996), who builds on 
Turnovsky et al.’s (1980) work on individual consumers and Finkelshtain and Chalfant’s 
(1991) work on price risk in the context of the AHM. In what follows in this subsection, 
we report the basics of the model. Readers interested in more detailed explanations and 
derivations of these findings are encouraged to consult those prior works.  
 
Consider a representative agricultural household whose preferences are represented 
by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function )(⋅U  defined over consumption of a 
                                                 
5
 In what follows, we abstract from credit market, storage, and informal transfer considerations. While 
incorporating these aspects of household behavior would undoubtedly make for a more realistic model of 
household behavior, we opt for a simpler specification so as to focus on the behavior of households in the 
face of price risk. In reality, households adopt a host of measures to manage the risks they face. We focus 
purely on the effect of multicommodity price risk precisely because it has been seriously understudied. 
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vector ),...,,( 21 oKooo cccc =  of K goods whose consumption and/or production is 
observed and whose associated stochastic price vector is ),...,,( 21 oKooo pppp = ; a 
composite uc  of all goods whose consumption and/or production is unobserved by the 
econometrician and whose associated stochastic composite price is up ;
6
 and leisure l . 
The function )(⋅U  is concave in each of its arguments, with the Inada condition 
∞=
∂
∂
=0x
x
U
 with respect to each argument x. 
 
All K goods observed and the unobserved good can, in principle, be produced and 
consumed by the household.7 The household has an endowment LE  of time and an 
endowment AE  of land. The production of each of the K observed commodities is 
denoted by 
 
 ),( oioioi ALF , },...,1{ Ki ∈ ,       (1) 
 
where oiL  denotes the amount of labor used in producing observed commodity i and oiA  
denotes the amount of cultivable land used in producing observed commodity i. The 
production of the unobserved good is denoted by 
 
 ),( uuu ALF ,         (2) 
 
where uL  and uA  denote the amount of labor and cultivable land, respectively, used in 
producing the unobserved commodity. Both oiF  and uF  are strictly increasing but 
weakly concave in each argument. 
 
                                                 
6
 In order simplify the exposition, we refer to the vector of commodities whose consumption and 
production is unobserved by the econometrician as “the unobserved good” in what follows. 
7
 For example, it is quite common in developing countries for rural household to grow a staple crop (e.g., 
barley, wheat, maize, etc.) and many other non-staple crops (e.g., coffee, beans, etc.) For a specific crop, it 
is also common for some households to be net buyers of it, for some households to be autarkic with respect 
to it, and for some households to be net sellers of it. Finally, households may switch from one category – 
net buyer, autarkic, or net seller – to another from one period to the next (Bellemare and Barrett, 2006). 
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Agricultural labor is a function of household labor on the farm fL and of hired labor 
hL , but note that those are imperfect substitutes given that monitoring of hired workers 
may be imperfect, with the usual moral hazard consequence (Feder, 1985; Frisvold, 
1994). A general function h(·) maps hired labor into family labor equivalent units. The 
household can also sell a quantity mL  of labor on the market at parametric wage rate w, 
but the market for credit is assumed missing. 
 
The household’s time constraint is such that Lfu
i
f
oi
m ELLL ≤+++ ∑l , where l  is 
the household’s leisure time; foiL  is the amount of household labor devoted to production 
of observed commodity i and fuL  is the amount of household labor devoted to production 
of the unobserved good. The household’s land constraint is such that Afm EAA ≤+ , 
where mA  is the amount of household land leased out on the tenancy market at 
parametric rental rate r ; and ∑ +≡
i
f
u
f
oi
f AAA  is the amount of household land devoted 
to the production of the observable and unobservable commodities, respectively. 
Likewise, hoiA  and huA  are the amounts of leased in land devoted to the production of the 
observable and unobservable commodities, respectively, so that hoifoioi AAA +≡  and 
h
u
f
uu AAA +≡  are the total amounts of land allocated to the production of the observable 
and unobservable commodities. Finally, let I denote the household’s unearned income, 
i.e., income from transfers or remittances. 
 
In what follows, we consider a two-period model. That is, all (stochastic) product 
prices are unknown when labor allocation decisions are made, but post-harvest prices are 
revealed before consumption decisions are made. The household’s problem is thus to 
 ),,(maxmax
},{},,,,,,,,,,{
l
l
uo
ccALLLALLAAA
ccUE
uo
mf
u
h
u
f
oi
f
oi
h
oi
mf
u
h
u
h
oi
     
 (3) 
 
subject to 
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*Ycpcp uuoo ≤+ ,        (4) 
 ][][* ∑∑ −−+−−≡ oi
h
u
h
oi
m
oi
h
u
h
oi
m AAArLLLwY   
IALFpALFp uuuui oioioioi +++∑ ),(),( ,   (5) 
 
f
oi
h
oioi LLhL +≡ )(  i∀ ,        (6) 
 
f
u
h
uu LLhL +≡ )( ,        (7) 
 
L
i
f
u
f
oi
m ELLL ≤+++ ∑l ,       (8) 
 
f
u
i
f
oi
f AAA +≡∑         (9) 
 ∑ +≡
i
h
u
h
oi
h AAA         (10) 
 
Afm EAA ≤+         (11) 
 ],0[)( hoihoi LLh ∈ , and        (12) 
 ],0[)( huhu LLh ∈ .        (13) 
 
Given that the household’s utility function is strictly increasing, preferences are locally 
non-satiated and so the constraints in equations (4), (8) and (11) bind. The household 
allocates labor and land conditional on its expectations regarding its ex post optimal 
choices of oc , uc , and l . 
 
By Epstein’s (1975) duality result, we can use the household’s variable indirect utility 
function )(⋅V , which is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income, i.e., the 
measurement unit chosen to measure prices and income do not matter. Thus, we can set 
the price of the unobserved commodity up  as numéraire, so that uoii ppp =  and 
upYy
*
= . Finally, assume that the household is income risk-averse, in the sense that 
02
2
<=
∂
∂
yyVy
V
.
8
 
 
                                                 
8
 In a slight abuse of notation, we use subscripts not only to denote commodities but also the partial 
derivatives of the function V(·) in what follows. 
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Using the household’s (variable) indirect utility function, we can rewrite the 
household’s maximization problem as 
 
 ),,(max
},,,,,,,{
ypEV i
ALLLALA mfu
h
u
f
oi
f
oi
h
oi
h
oi
l
l
      (14) 
 
subject to 
 
 ][][ hufu
i i
h
oi
f
oi
Ah
u
f
ui i
h
oi
f
oi
L AAAAErLLLLEwY −−−−+−−−−−= ∑ ∑∑ ∑l  
   IALFALFp uuui oioioii +++∑ ),(),( .   (15) 
 
The first-order necessary conditions (FONCs) for this problem are then: 
 
with respect to hoiL : 0≤














−
∂
∂
w
L
F
pVE h
oi
oi
iy  ( 0=  if 0>hoiL ),   (16) 
with respect to hoiA : 0≤














−
∂
∂
r
A
F
pVE h
oi
oi
iy  ( 0=  if 0>hoiA ),   (17) 
with respect to foiL : 0≤














−
∂
∂
w
L
F
pVE f
oi
oi
iy  ( 0=  if 0>foiL ),   (18) 
with respect to foiA : 0≤














−
∂
∂
r
A
F
pVE f
oi
oi
iy  ( 0=  if 0>foiA ), and  (19) 
with respect to l : { } 0≤− wVVE yl  ( 0=  if 0>l ).     (20) 
 
Intuitively, the terms in parentheses in equations (16) to (19) mean that the household is a 
profit maximizer (i.e., it sets the value of its marginal product of labor equal to the wage 
rate, and the value of its marginal product of land equal to the rental rate), and equation 
(20) means that the household will set its (expected) marginal utility of leisure equal to 
the marginal cost of leisure. This set of FONCs is similar to what is usually derived from 
the basic agricultural household model (Singh et al., 1986; Bardhan and Udry, 1999). 
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A slightly similar version of this framework was used by Barrett (1996) to explain the 
existence of the inverse farm size–productivity relationship as a result of staple food crop 
price risk. We now extend this framework to the case of multiple goods with stochastic 
prices. As such, the next subsection shows how to derive the household’s matrix of own- 
and cross-price risk aversion coefficients. 
 
2.2. Price Risk Aversion over Multiple Commodities 
Let ),( ypV  denote the household’s indirect utility function. The vector ),...,( 1 Kppp =  
is the vector of commodity prices faced by the household over the observed commodities, 
while the scalar y  denotes household income. Let ip  denote the price of commodity i 
and jp  denote the price of commodity j, without any loss of generality. We know from 
Barrett (1996) that 
 
 )(sign)],([sign
iypiy
VpVCov = .      (21) 
 
Moreover, let ),,(),(),( ypzMypxpzsM iiii =−=  be the marketable surplus of 
commodity i, where )(⋅is  is the household supply of commodity i, which depends on 
input and commodity prices, and )(⋅ix  is its Marshallian demand for commodity i, which 
depends on commodity prices and income. By Roy’s identity, i.e., 
yV
pV
M ii ∂∂
∂∂
=
/
/
,
9
 we 
have that 
 
 
j
p
i
p
y M
V
M
V
V ji == ,         (22) 
 
where jM  is the marketable surplus of commodity j. Additionally, 
 
                                                 
9
 One can apply Roy’s identity to the marketable surplus equation given that it is both additive and convex. 
See also Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991). 
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







∂
∂
−=








∂
∂
−= y
j
i
pp
ij
i
i
p
i
pp
yp Vp
MV
Mp
M
M
V
M
V
V
ji
iji
j
1
2 .    (23) 
 
We also have that 
 
 yip
y
p
i VMVV
V
M
i
i
=⇔= ,       (24) 
 
which implies that 
 
 
j
i
yypipp p
M
VVMV
jji ∂
∂
+= ,       (25) 
 
which, in turn, implies that 
 
 
ii yp
i
yyyiyp Vy
MVVMV =
∂
∂
+= ,       (26) 
 
where the last equation is the result of applying Young’s theorem on the symmetry of 
second derivatives, which requires that (i) )(⋅V  be a differentiable function over ),( yp ; 
and (ii) its cross-partials exist and be continuous at all points on some open set. 
 
Replacing 
iyp
V  by equation 6 in equation 5 yields 
 
 
j
i
y
j
yyyjipp p
MV
y
M
VVMMV
ji ∂
∂
+






∂
∂
+= .     (27) 
 
Then, we have that 
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j
y
j
yiyyjipp p
MiV
y
M
VMVMMV
ji ∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+= .     (28) 
 
Multiplying the first term by yVyV yy /  yields      
 
 
j
y
j
yi
yji
pp p
MiV
y
M
VM
y
RVMM
V
ji ∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+−= ,    (30) 
where R is the household’s Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion. Multiplying 
the second term by yMyM jj /  and the third term by jiji pMpM /  yields 
 
 
j
i
ijy
j
jyi
yji
pp p
MV
y
M
VM
y
RVMM
V
ji
εη ++−= ,    (31) 
 
where jη  is the income-elasticity of the marketable surplus of commodity j and ijε  is the 
elasticity of commodity i with respect to the price of commodity j. Equation 31 is thus 
equivalent to 
 
 








++−=
j
ij
j
j
j
yipp py
M
y
RM
VMV
ji
1
εη .     (32) 
 
Multiplying the first two terms in the bracketed expression by jj pp /  yields 
 
 [ ]ijjjj
j
yi
pp Rp
VM
V
ji
εβηβ ++−= ,      (33) 
 
where jβ  is the budget share of commodity j. When simplified, equation 33 is such that 
 
 [ ]ijjj
j
yi
pp Rp
VM
V
ji
εηβ +−= )( .      (34) 
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Consequently, if Mi = 0, the household is indifferent to fluctuations in the price of good i 
(i.e., the variance in the price of good i) and to cofluctuations in the prices of goods i and 
j (i.e., the covariance between the prices of good i and j) since its autarky from the market 
leaves it unaffected at the margin by price volatility.  
 
Applying Young’s theorem once again, we obtain the following equation: 
 
 [ ] [ ]
ijji ppjiii
i
yj
ijjj
j
yi
pp VRp
VM
R
p
VM
V =+−=+−= εηβεηβ )()( .  (35) 
 
In other words, we obtain the ppV  matrix, which is such that 
 
 














=
KKKK
K
K
pppppp
pppppp
pppppp
pp
VVV
VVV
VVV
V
L
MOMM
L
K
21
22212
12111
,      (36) 
 
is symmetric. From the ppV  matrix, we can derive matrix A of price risk aversion 
coefficients, which is as follows: 
 
 














⋅−=⋅−=
KKKK
K
K
pppppp
pppppp
pppppp
y
pp
y
VVV
VVV
VVV
V
V
V
L
MOMM
L
K
21
22212
12111
11A
     
  












=
KKKK
K
K
AAA
AAA
AAA
L
MOMM
L
K
21
22221
11211
,      (37) 
 
where 
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[ ]ijjj
j
i
ij Rp
M
A εηβ +−−= )( .       (38) 
 
Matrix A has a relatively straightforward interpretation. The diagonal elements are 
analogous to Pratt’s (1964) coefficient of absolute (income) risk aversion, but with 
respect to prices. Thus, Aii > 0 implies that welfare is decreasing in the volatility of the 
price of i, i.e., that the household is price risk-averse (a hedger) over i; Aii = 0 implies that 
welfare is unaffected by the volatility of the price of i, i.e., that the household is price 
risk-neutral; and Aii < 0 implies that welfare is increasing in the volatility of the price of i, 
i.e., that the household is price risk-loving (a speculator) over i.10 Price risk-aversion is 
the classic concern of the literature on commodity price stabilization (Deschamps, 1973; 
Hanoch, 1974, Turnovsky, 1978; Turnovsky et al., 1980; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981).  
 
The interpretation of the off-diagonal terms is a bit trickier in that those reflect how 
variations in the price of one good due to variations in the price of another good affect 
household welfare. Put simply, if Aii captures the welfare impact of the variance of the 
price of commodity i holding other prices constant, the off-diagonal elements capture the 
impacts of price covariances. Consequently, Aij > (<) 0 implies that for an indirect 
increase in the volatility of price i attributable to an increase in the volatility of price j, 
household welfare decreases (increases), i.e., the household stands to gain from hedging 
against (speculating over) covariance in the prices of goods i and j.  
 
Taken as a whole, the price risk aversion coefficient matrix thus speaks directly to the 
total welfare effects of and household preferences with respect to multivariate price risk. 
Intuitively, the diagonal terms can be interpreted as the (direct) effect on household 
welfare of the variance in the price of a single good, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the off-
diagonal terms can be interpreted as the (indirect) effect on household welfare of the 
covariance between the prices of two goods, ceteris paribus. 
                                                 
10
 The hedger-speculator terminology is from Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), who apply it to the Keynes-
Hicks theory of futures markets. 
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Perhaps more importantly, there is no theoretical restriction on the sign of any 
element of A. As per equation 38, the sign of ijA  depends on (i) whether the household is 
a net buyer or a net seller of commodity i, i.e., on the sign of iM ; (ii) the sign of the 
budget share of the marketable surplus of commodity j, i.e., jβ ; (iii) whether the 
household’s coefficient of relative risk aversion R is less or greater than the income 
elasticity of the marketable surplus of commodity j, i.e., jη ; and (iv) the sign and 
magnitude of the elasticity of the marketable surplus of commodity i with respect to price 
j, i.e. ijε . The theory, however, implies a testable symmetry restriction on the estimated 
price risk aversion coefficients. With adequate data, one can test the null hypothesis 
 
 jiij AAH =:0  for all ji ≠ ,       (39) 
 
which, if the matrix of price risk aversion is defined over K commodities, represents 
2/)1( −KK  testable restrictions. In other words, the empirical content of equation 39 is 
simply that the impact on household welfare of the covariance between prices i and j 
should be the same as the impact on household welfare of the covariance between prices j 
and i. This is analogous to symmetry of the Slutsky matrix. The next section characterizes 
the relationship between the price risk aversion matrix A and the Slutsky matrix and 
shows how a test of the symmetry of A is a test of household rationality. 
 
2.3. Relationship between the Price Risk Aversion and Slutsky Matrices 
The derivations above raise a natural question: What is the relationship between the price 
risk aversion matrix and the Slutsky matrix? Let ),,( ypzM i  be the household’s 
marketable surplus of commodity i expressed as a function of the vector of input prices z 
and the vector of commodity prices p the household faces as well as its income y. We 
know the Slutsky matrix S is such that  
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That is, a household’s marginal utility with respect to a change in the price of good i  
varies as a result of a change in the price of good j  (i.e., 
ji pp
V ), and this change is a 
function of the commodity’s own-income effect as well as the cross-price effect between 
goods i  and j . In this sense, since the cross-price risk aversion ijA  between goods i  and 
j  is linked to both jjS  and ijS , there does not exist a one-to-one correspondence 
between the elements of matrices A and S. This can be seen by rewriting the last 
expression as 
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In other words, one cannot recover the Slutsky matrix from the matrix of price risk 
aversion coefficients. The two matrices, however, are related, and the derivations above 
lead to the following result. 
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Proposition 1: Under the preceding assumptions and if the cross-partials of the 
household’s indirect utility function exist and are continuous at all points on some open 
set, symmetry of the matrix of price risk aversion coefficients is equivalent to symmetry 
of the Slutsky matrix. 
 
Proof: Symmetry of the Slutsky matrix implies that 
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By Roy’s Identity, the above statement can be rewritten as 
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which, once the second-order partials are written explicitly, is equivalent to 
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This last equation can then be arranged to show that 
 
 
( )
jijiijijijji pyppyppyppypypppp
VVVVVVVVVVV +−−=− .   (46) 
 
By Young’s Theorem, we know that 
ijji pppp
VV = , that 
jiji pyppyp
VVVV = , and that 
ypyp jj
VV = , so both sides of the previous equation are identically equal to zero. In other 
 18
words, symmetry of the Slutsky matrix implies and is implied by symmetry of the matrix 
A of price risk aversion coefficients.■ 
 
The symmetry of the Slutsky matrix and the symmetry of the matrix of price risk 
aversion coefficients have the same empirical content in that they both embody the 
rationality of the household. But symmetry of the Slutsky matrix should be easier to 
reject than symmetry of the matrix of price risk aversion given that it imposes much more 
structure on the data than symmetry of the matrix of price risk aversion. Indeed, 
symmetry of the matrix A of price risk aversion coefficients only requires that 
ji pp
V
 not 
be statistically significantly different from 
ij pp
V . Symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, 
however, requires (i) that 
ji pp
V
 not be statistically significantly different from 
ij pp
V ; (ii) 
that 
ji pyp
VV
 not be statistically significantly different from 
ji pyp
VV ; and (iii) that 
jyp
V
 not 
be statistically significantly different from yp jV . As a result, it should be easier to reject 
symmetry of the Slutsky matrix than it is to reject symmetry of the matrix of price risk 
aversion coefficients, simply because the former imposes more restriction on the data. 
 
2.4. Willingness to Pay for Price Stabilization 
Policymakers routinely try to stabilize one or more staple good prices, but what are the 
welfare effects of such efforts? This subsection derives the appropriate WTP measures 
necessary to establish the welfare gains from partial price stabilization, i.e., from 
stabilizing one or more commodity prices.11 
 
In order to tackle this question with respect to the prices of K observable 
commodities, one first needs to compute the total WTP for those K commodities, which 
is obtained by computing the difference between (i) the consumer’s utility if prices were 
held fixed at their respective expectations (i.e., the first term in the numerator below); and 
                                                 
11
 The measures derived in this section are partial in the sense that they only stabilize prices for a subset of 
the (potentially infinite) set of commodities consumed and produced by the household, as it is essentially 
impossible to stabilize prices completely since the costs of stabilization increase exponentially with the 
degree of stabilization pursued (Knudsen and Nash, 1990). 
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(ii) the expected utility of the consumer in the face of stochastic prices (i.e., the second 
term in the numerator below), such that 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
yy V
ypVypEVE
V
ypVEypEVWTP ,()),(),(),( −=−= .   (47) 
 
A Taylor series approximation around ( )( ),V E p y  yields 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
y
ppp
V
pEpypEVpEppEpypEVE
WTP




−−−−−
≈
)(),(')(
2
1)(),(
.  
(48) 
 
In other words, 
 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ]
y
pp
V
pEpypEVpEppEpE
WTP
)(),(')()(
2
1 −−−
−≈   (49) 
 
and so 
 
∑ ∑∑ ∑
= == =
=−≈
K
i
K
j ijij
K
i
K
j
y
pp
ij AV
V
WTP ji
1 11 1 2
1
2
1
σσ ,    (50) 
 
where ijσ  is the covariance between prices i and j and ijA  is the coefficient of price risk 
aversion, as defined above. By symmetry of matrix A, the above is equivalent to 
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These derivations provide the transfer payment a policymaker would need to make to 
the household in order to compensate it for the uncertainty over ),...,( 1 Kpp . If instead 
one wishes to stabilize only one price i, the above derivations reduce to 
 
[ ]∑ ≠+≈ K ij ijijiiiii AAWTP σσ21 ,      (52) 
 
and, by symmetry of matrix A and of the price covariance matrix, the above is equivalent 
to 
 
 [ ]∑ ≠+≈ K ij jijiiiiii AAWTP σσ21 .      (53) 
 
Because equations 52 and 53 are equivalent, the WTP for commodity i can be computed 
in two ways, i.e., via either the rows or the columns of matrix A. This provides the 
transfer payment a policymaker would need to make to the household in order to 
compensate it for the uncertainty over ip . Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1997) introduced a 
similar measure, but their framework considered only one stochastic price, de facto 
ignoring the covariances between prices. Realistically, however, even the WTP for a 
single commodity i depends on the covariance between the price i and the prices of other 
commodities j. In other words, a price stabilization policy focusing solely on the price of 
commodity i would bias the estimated WTP for commodity i, unless 0=ijσ  or 0=ijA  
for all ji ≠ . 
 
Lastly, we note that it is impossible to determine a priori whether WTP or WTPi will 
be biased upward or downward when the covariance terms are ignored as in Finkelshtain 
and Chalfant (1997). This is because the direction of the bias will depend on the sign of 
the covariances and on the sign of the off-diagonal terms of the matrix of price risk 
aversion that are involved in computing WTP or WTPi. 
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We empirically demonstrate the theory developed in the previous section by estimating 
the price risk aversion coefficient matrix and household WTP for price stabilization using 
four rounds of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) data12 (1994a, 1994b, 
1995, and 1997). The ERHS recorded both household consumption and production 
decisions using a standardized survey instrument across the rounds we retain for analysis. 
The sample includes a total of 1494 households across 16 districts (woredas) with an 
attrition rate of only 2 percent across the four rounds selected for analysis (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 1998).13 The average household in the data was observed 5.7 times over four 
rounds and three seasons,14 with only 7 households appearing only once in the data. The 
estimations in this paper thus rely on a sample of 8556 observations.15 
 
Many households were autarkic with respect to several commodities (i.e., they neither 
bought or sold those commodities). For every season (i.e., the time period we consider in 
these data; each seasons lasts three months) in which a household is neither a net buyer 
nor a net seller of a given commodity, this household has a marketable surplus of zero for 
that particular commodity. In what follows, we focus on coffee, maize, horse beans, 
barley, wheat, teff, and sorghum, i.e., the top seven staple commodities when considering 
the proportion of observations with a nonzero marketable surplus. 
 
                                                 
12
 These data are made available by the Department of Economics at Addis Ababa University (AAU), the 
Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University, and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI). Funding for data collection was provided by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID). The preparation of the public release version of the ERHS data was 
supported in part by the World Bank, but AAU, CSAE, IFPRI, ESRC, SIDA, USAID, and the World Bank 
are not responsible for any errors in these data or for their use or interpretation. 
13
 Ethiopia is subdivided into eleven zones subdivided into woredas, which are roughly equivalent to 
counties in the United Kingdom or United States. 
14
 Within-round variation in seasons occurred only in 1994a and 1997. Because the season was not 
specified for the 1994b and 1995 rounds, we cannot control for seasonality in the empirical analysis of 
section 5. 
15
 The original data included several outliers when considering the marketable surpluses of the seven 
commodities we study. These outliers caused certain percentage values (e.g., the WTP measures below) to 
lie far outside the 0 to 100 percent interval. As a remedy, for each of the seven marketable surpluses used 
below, we kept only the 99 percent confidence interval (i.e., ± 2.576 standard deviations) around the 
median, the mean being too sensitive to outliers. We thus dropped 188 observations.  
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these seven commodities. A positive 
(negative) mean marketable surplus indicates that the average household is a net seller 
(buyer) of a commodity. The average household is a net buyer of every staple. Table 2 
further characterizes the dependent variables by focusing on the nonzero marketable 
surplus observations and by comparing descriptive statistics between net buyers and net 
sellers. Except for coffee and wheat, the purchases of the average net buyer household 
exceed the sales of the average net seller household. For every commodity, there are 
many households in both the net buyer, autarkic, and net seller categories, reflecting 
potentially heterogeneous welfare effects with respect to commodity price volatility in 
rural Ethiopia. 
 
Table 3 lists the mean real (i.e., corrected for the consumer price index) price in 
Ethiopian birr for each of the seven commodities we study,16 the average seasonal 
household income, and the average seasonal nonzero household income in the full 
sample. The income measure used in this paper is the sum of proceeds from crop sales, 
off-farm income, and livestock sales per period. That said, average income from the 
aforementioned sources is different from zero in only about 82 percent of cases, which 
explains why the average seasonal income of about $94 ($376 annually) may seem low. 
When focusing on nonzero income, the average seasonal income increases to about $106 
($424 annually).  
 
Table 3 also presents the budget share of each staple commodity. Food represents the 
overwhelming majority of rural Ethiopian household expenditures, at least 85 percent. 
This falls on the upper end of global estimates of such budget shares, reflecting the 
extreme poverty of this population, the conspicuous absence of much other than food to 
purchase in rural Ethiopia, and the inability to impute the value of home rental income 
and expenditure in the ERHS data. Purchases of teff and coffee represent the largest 
budget shares, with 21 and 15 percent of the average household budget, respectively. The 
purchases of staple crops such as maize, barley, and wheat come close at 13, 12, and 11 
                                                 
16
 As of writing, US$1 ≈ Birr 9.43. 
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percent, respectively, of the average household budget. The purchases of beans and 
sorghum come last, with 7 and 6 percent, respectively, of the average household budget. 
 
Finally, because price covariances play an important role in computing household 
WTP for price stabilization, table 4 reports the variance-covariance matrix for the prices 
of the seven staple commodities retained for analysis. Note that coffee exhibits, by far, 
the most price volatility. Since coffee is also one of only two crops where net sellers’ 
mean net sales volumes exceed net buyers’ mean net purchase volumes – recall that net 
sellers are always price risk averse in the single stochastic price setting (Finkelshtain and 
Chalfant 1991, Barrett 1996) – these descriptive statistics suggest that stabilization of 
coffee prices is more likely to generate welfare gains than would stabilization of other 
commodity prices. The estimates we report in Section 5 corroborate this simple insight. 
 
4. Empirical Framework 
As defined previously, a household’s marketable surplus of a given commodity i, 
),,( ypzM i , is the quantity harvested of that commodity (i.e., household supply, which 
depends on input prices z) net of the quantity purchased and the household’s consumption 
of its own harvest (i.e., household demand, which depends on output prices p and income 
y), a reduced form function of input and output prices and household income.  
 
4.1. Estimation Strategy 
The ERHS data include commodity prices and allow us to compute household income, 
but they only include village-level average wage as an input price. Given that all 
households in an area face common market prices at the same time, however, we use 
woreda-round fixed effects to control for the input prices faced by each household in 
each location in each period. Time-invariant household fixed effects provide further 
control for household-specific transactions costs related to distance from the main 
woreda market, social relationships that may confer preferential pricing, and other 
household-specific transaction costs that determine whether a household is a net buyer of 
a commodity, autarkic with respect to it, or a net seller of the same commodity (de Janvry 
et al., 1991). 
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We estimate the following marketable surplus functions for the seven commodities i 
discussed in the previous section: 
 
 tiktikitjitiitkiitik ddppyM lllllll ντλϕφδα ++++++= lnlnln ,  (54)  
 
where i denotes a specific commodity,17 k denotes the household, l  denotes the woreda, 
and t denotes the round; y  denotes household income net of income from commodity i; 
ip  is a measure of the price of commodity i; jp  is a vector of measures of the prices of 
all (observed) commodities other than i; 
lkd  is a vector of household dummies; tdl  is a 
vector of woreda-round dummies that controls for the price of the unobservable 
composite consumer good as well as for input prices, among other things; and ν  is a 
mean zero, iid error term.18,19 
 
We estimate equation (54) over 1,494 households across four rounds and three 
seasons, clustering standard errors at the woreda level. No household was observed over 
all four rounds and three seasons; the number of observations per household ranged from 
one to six.20 We also include as explanatory variables all commodity prices available in 
the data (i.e., coffee, maize, beans, barley, wheat, teff, sorghum, potatoes, onions, 
cabbage, milk, tella, sugar, salt, and cooking oil.)21 
 
Computation of own- and cross-price elasticities, of the income elasticity, and of the 
budget share of marketable surplus follows directly from equation 54. As an example, to 
                                                 
17
 Subscripts on coefficients thus denote coefficients from specific commodity equations. 
18
 We also add 0.001 to each observation for the variables for which logarithms are taken so as to not drop 
observations in a nonrandom fashion and introduce selection bias (MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986). 
Robustness checks were conducted during preliminary empirical work in which 0.1 and 0.000001 were 
added instead of 0.001, with no significant change to the empirical results. 
19
 We do not estimate the marketable surplus equations using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) since 
SUR estimation brings no efficiency gain over estimating the various equations in the system separately 
when the dependent variables are all regressed on the same set of regressors. 
20
 By controlling for household unobservables, the use of fixed effects controls for the possible selection 
problem posed by households for which we only have one observation through time (Verbeek and Nijman, 
1992). 
21
 Tella is a traditional Ethiopian beer made from teff and maize. 
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obtain the estimated cross-price risk aversion coefficient ijAˆ , one first computes budget 
share ypM jjj /ˆ =β  and income elasticity jjj M/ˆˆ δη =  using the estimates of equation 
for commodity j; and cross-price elasticity iiij M/ˆˆ ϕε =  using estimates of the equation 
for commodity i. The variables Mj, pj, and Mi are available in the data. One then 
combines these estimates to obtain the point estimate 
 
 ]ˆ)ˆ(ˆ[ˆ ijjj
j
i
ij Rp
M
A εηβ +−−= .      (55) 
 
Given that marketable surplus is often zero, we use the mean of jM  and iM  so as to 
compute elasticities (and later compute WTP) at means. Although it might be preferable 
to use mean elasticities, it is simply not possible in these data.22  
 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion R can either be directly estimated, if the data 
allow, or assumed equal to a certain value. Given that our data do not allow direct 
estimation of R, we estimate the ijA  coefficients for 1=R , 2=R , and 3=R , which 
covers the range of credible values found in the literature (Friend and Blume, 1975; 
Hansen and Singleton, 1982; Chavas and Holt, 1993; Saha et al., 1994). This provides 
additional robustness checks on our empirical results. 
 
4.2. Identification Strategy 
The identification of φ  and ϕ  comes from the variation in own-price both within each 
household over time, since each household retained in the estimation is observed more 
than once, and between woreda-round, since prices are common to all households in the 
same woreda in the same round. Identification of δ  comes from the intertemporal 
variation in income both within and between households within a round and woreda. 
 
                                                 
22
 Likewise, given that we use the household’s income from non-agricultural sources as a proxy for total 
income y so as to avoid endogeneity problems, many households have a residual income of zero. In this 
case, we compute the estimated budget share by dividing by y + 0.001 (MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986). 
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Since households are price takers for all commodities, all prices are exogenous in 
equation (54). Income, however, is likely endogenous, if only because a positive 
marketable surplus implies an additional source of revenue for the household. 
Unfortunately, the data do not include a credible instrument for income. Including both 
household and woreda-round fixed effects should purge the error term of a great deal of 
its prospective correlation with income, however, since a household’s status as a net 
seller is primarily driven by preferences and by the household-specific transactions costs 
it faces (de Janvry et al., 1991; Goetz, 1992; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006), which are 
accounted for by the household fixed effect, as well as by climatic and other 
environmental fluctuations that affect production (Sherlund et al., 2002), which are 
largely accounted for by the woreda-round fixed effect. Finally, as discussed above, the 
potential endogeneity problem caused by the absence of input prices from the data is 
accounted for by our inclusion of woreda-round fixed effects, which control for local 
market conditions. 
 
Because many households have a marketable surplus of zero for several commodities, 
we estimate several sub-matrices of price risk aversion coefficients.23 We first test the A 
sub-matrix for the top three commodities consumed and produced by the sample 
households (i.e., coffee, maize, and beans; we label that sub-matrix A3), and then test the 
sub-matrices defined by the top four, five, six, and seven commodities (we label these 
sub-matrices A4 to A7). With three different assumptions on relative risk aversion R and 
five different sub-matrices in each case, we generate a range of estimated WTP for 
incomplete commodity price stabilization and conduct a total of 15 tests of the null 
hypothesis of symmetry of the matrix of price risk aversion. The consistency of results 
provides some assurance of the robustness of the empirical findings. 
 
5. Estimation Results and Hypothesis Tests 
This section first presents estimation results for the marketable surplus equation in 
equation 54 for all seven commodities. Given that these results are ancillary, we only 
                                                 
23
 We use the term “sub-matrix” given that the number of commodities produced and consumed by the 
household in theory goes to infinity. This is similar to Turnovsky et al. (1980), who only consider a subset 
of commodities in their theoretical analysis. 
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briefly discuss them so as to devote the bulk of our discussion to the estimated matrix of 
price risk aversion and, more importantly, to our estimates of household willingness to 
pay for price stabilization. 
 
Table 5 presents estimation results for the seven marketable surplus equations. 
Intuitively, one would expect the iφ  (i.e., own-price) coefficients to be positive. That is, 
as the price of commodity i increases, the household buys less or sells more of the same 
commodity. Indeed, own price has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
marketable surplus of all commodities except wheat, for which the point estimate is 
statistically insignificantly different from zero.  
 
The cross-price coefficients whose signs are consistent (i.e., of the same sign) among 
equations – for example, the coefficient estimate for the price of barley is negative in the 
coffee equation, and the coefficient estimate for the price of coffee is also negative in the 
barley equation – indicate that some goods are substitutes for one another (e.g., coffee 
and barley; maize and sorghum; beans and sorghum; and wheat and sorghum) while 
others are complements (e.g., coffee and wheat; teff and coffee; beans and barley; barley 
and teff; wheat and teff). Since these estimates reveal statistically significant 
complementarities and substitution effects, it looks as though ignoring covariance effects 
would necessarily bias estimates of price risk aversion, as discussed previously.  
 
5.1. Price Risk Aversion Matrix 
We use the estimation results reported in table 5 to compute coefficients of own- and 
cross-price risk aversion and use these coefficients to construct sub-matrices A3 to A7 of 
price risk aversion. The ERHS households are significantly own-price risk-averse over all 
commodities. Table 6a reports estimates under the intermediate assumption of R=2; 
Appendix tables A1a and A2a report estimates for R=1 and R=3, respectively. The 
average household appears most significantly own-price risk-averse over barley, maize 
and teff – the commodities with the greatest net purchase volumes – and least price risk-
averse over coffee and beans, which have the lowest mean net sales (purchases) volumes 
 28
among net sellers (buyers), as reflected in Table 2.24 Most rural Ethiopians’ price risk 
exposure to these latter commodities is quite modest, hence the relatively low price risk 
aversion coefficient estimates.  
 
The statistical significance and magnitude of the off-diagonal elements of the 
estimated A matrix underscore the importance of estimating price risk aversion in a 
multivariate context. All 42 off-diagonal point estimates are statistically significantly 
different from zero, all of them positive, indicating aversion to positive cofluctuations in 
commodity prices. Looking at either the upper or lower triangle of matrix A in table 6a, 
households are most price risk-averse over co-fluctuations in the prices of (i) teff and 
maize; (ii) teff and wheat; (ii) wheat and barley; and (iv) teff and barley. Given that 
barley, maize, and teff are staples, it is not surprising that households get hurt the most by 
co-movements between their respective prices. Similarly, households are least price risk-
averse over co-fluctuations in the prices of (i) sorghum and coffee; (ii) beans and coffee; 
and (iii) wheat and coffee. Given that coffee is a nonstaple, it is not surprising that 
households get hurt the least by co-movements between its price and the prices of other 
commodities. A single-price approach to estimating price risk aversion would assume 
these cross-price effects all equal zero, which would bias estimates of own-price risk 
aversion. In particular, they would fail to capture how households dislike covariation in 
multiple prices that limits their capacity to substitute among commodities in response to 
price shocks. 
 
We illustrate the necessity of our approach with the example of teff. First, note that in 
table 6a, households are risk-averse over the price of teff. This is the direct effect of 
fluctuations in the price of teff. Recall, however, that the covariances between price of 
teff and the prices of other commodities were all positive in table 4, so that an increase in 
the volatility of the price of teff is correlated with variation in other food prices, over 
which households are also risk averse. This generates an indirect welfare effect of 
fluctuations in the price of teff through its covariance with other food prices. To obtain 
                                                 
24
 The coefficients in table 6a are directly comparable between one another given that the marketable 
surpluses are all expressed in kilograms, and prices are all expressed in Ethiopian birr. 
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the total welfare effect in the price of teff, one needs to consider the coefficient estimates 
in the “teff” row or the coefficient estimates in the “teff” column of matrix A, as in 
equations 52 and 53, as we discuss in the next section. 
 
Before discussing welfare effects, however, recall that the theoretical framework in 
section 2 implied symmetry of the A matrix. Although we reject the null hypothesis of 
symmetry for sub-matrices A3 to A7, as shown in table 6b under the assumption that R = 
2,25 note that each ijAˆ  is extremely close to its associated jiAˆ . In fact, computing 
}ˆ,ˆmax{/}ˆ,ˆmin{ jiijjiij AAAA  for all ji ≠
 
in order to measure the discrepancies between 
matched off-diagonal terms, the minimum such measure equals just 0.966. In other 
words, two matched off-diagonal coefficients differ by, at most, by three percent, hardly 
a substantive deviation from symmetry. Even though the formal statistical test rejects the 
symmetry hypothesis for the estimated A matrix, households certainly seem to behave 
remarkably similarly to how the theory developed in section 2 would predict.  
 
5.2. Willingness to Pay Estimates for Price Stabilization 
Recall from section 2.4 that the WTP for stabilization of a single commodity price can be 
estimated by considering either the rows or columns of matrix A of price risk aversion, 
but that both values coincide by construction for total WTP. For our three relative risk 
aversion assumptions (i.e., }3,2,1{∈R ), tables 7a and 7b show the estimated average 
household WTP (expressed as a proportion of household income) to stabilize the prices 
of individual commodities as well as to stabilize the prices of all seven commodities 
considered in this paper. In what follows, we only discuss the results for R = 2, but the 
interpretation of the results for R = 1 or R = 3 is similar. 
 
Estimating WTP with the rows of A in table 7a, the average WTP estimates are all 
statistically significantly different from zero. The commodity for which the average 
household would be willing to pay the highest proportion of its budget to stabilize the 
price is coffee (14.2 percent). Although the estimated coefficients of own-price risk 
                                                 
25
 This result is robust to alternative assumptions about the coefficient of income risk aversion R (see 
Appendix A). 
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aversion are greatest for the main staple crops (teff, maize and barley) for which net 
marketed surplus exposure is greatest – for both net buyers and net sellers – because 
coffee price volatility is more than two orders of magnitude greater than for any other 
commodity, WTP for price stabilization is greatest for coffee, nearly an order of 
magnitude greater than for any grain. WTP for price stabilization is a function of both the 
magnitude of a commodity’s price volatility and a household’s market exposure, and thus 
price risk aversion coefficients.  
 
The average household’s WTP estimate to stabilize the prices of these seven 
commodities is 6-32 percent of its income, depending on one’s assumed income risk 
aversion (6 percent for R = 1; 19 percent for R = 2; 32 percent for R = 3). That proportion 
is statistically significant at the one percent level clearly indicating aggregate willingness 
to pay to stabilize food commodity prices in rural Ethiopia.  
 
By way of comparison, we compute the WTP measures derived by Finkelshtain and 
Chalfant (1997) in the case of a single stochastic commodity price, ignoring the 
covariances between prices (Table 7c). We reject the null hypothesis that either of our 
total WTP measures equals the analog measure ignoring the covariance between prices, 
with a p-value of 0.00. Consequently, in these data, covariances between prices matter. 
Ignoring them significantly underestimates the average welfare loss due to price risk. 
 
In order to be more specific about the distribution of the welfare gains from price 
stabilization, figure 1 plots the results of a second-degree fractional polynomial 
regression of the estimated household-specific WTP to stabilize the prices of all seven 
commodities on household income, along with the associated 95 percent confidence 
band.26 Three important features appear in figure 1. First, a significant share (31%) of 
households are price risk-loving (i.e., the households whose WTP for price stabilization 
is statistically significantly negative) while a somewhat larger share (39%) are price risk-
averse (i.e., the households whose WTP for price stabilization is statistically significantly 
                                                 
26
 We refer readers interested in using fractional polynomial regressions to Royston and Altman (1997), 
who prove a good discussion of both the method as well as of its usefulness. See Henley and Peirson 
(1997) for an economic application. 
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positive). Thus the population is roughly equally divided among those who favor, oppose 
or are indifferent about price stabilization. 
 
Second, the significantly price risk-loving households are markedly poorer than the 
significantly price risk-averse ones. Poorer households are more likely to be net 
consumers of all goods because they own fewer productive assets on average. And pure 
consumer theory holds that consumers are generally price risk-loving due to the 
quasiconvexity of the indirect utility function. Conversely, better-off households are more 
likely to be producers of all goods because they own more productive assets. Their price 
risk preferences are therefore more consistent with the predictions of pure producer 
theory, which holds that firms are generally price risk-averse (Baron, 1970; Sandmo, 
1971). Table 8 shows the income percentile ranges for which households are statistically 
significantly price risk-loving, price risk-neutral, and price risk-averse. Households in the 
top 39 percent of the income distribution (i.e., the households whose seasonal income lies 
between 442 and 10,000 birr) are expected to gain from price stabilization, while the 
poorest 62 percent of the income distribution lose out from price stabilization, on 
average. This suggests that price stabilization would be a distributionally regressive 
policy in Ethiopia, benefiting the better off at the expense of poorer households. 
Turnovsky (1978) discussed various theoretical predictions regarding the winners and 
losers from price stabilization between consumers and producers. His results, however, 
depended on whether (i) price uncertainty stems from random fluctuations in supply or in 
demand; (ii) price uncertainty is additive or multiplicative; and (iii) supply and demand 
functions are linear. Our empirical approach is free from such assumptions and lets the 
data speak for themselves. 
 
Third, the magnitude of price risk preferences is far higher among the price risk-
averse than among the price risk-loving, hence the sizable average WTP for price risk 
stabilization even though the population is roughly evenly divided among the price risk-
averse, price risk-loving and price risk-neutral subpopulations. Combined with the 
previous points, this underscores how simple averages may mask essential heterogeneity 
that is important in both equity and political economy terms. 
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Given the generally greater political influence of wealthier subpopulations in 
determining food price policy (Lipton 1977, Bates 1981) and the greater incentives for 
political mobilization among subgroups with a larger personal stake in the outcome 
(Olson 1965), the three preceding observations may help partly explain some of the 
political economy of food price stabilization in spite of heterogeneous preference for food 
price stability. Indeed, because economic policy is often subject to élite capture (i.e., the 
wealthy often have more of a say than the poor in the political process), these 
observations correspond relatively well with the “developmental paradox”, i.e., the 
empirical regularity according to which the more developed a country, the more its 
government subsidizes agriculture and favors stabilizing crop prices (Lindert, 1991; 
Barrett, 1999). 
 
5.3. Ex Ante Changes in Social Welfare Under Three Stylized Policy Scenarios 
As is well known, pure price stabilization through price fixing regulations or buffer stock 
management introduces considerable distortions in the economy (Krueger et al., 1988, 
Williams and Wright 1991). In this subsection we therefore briefly consider an 
alternative to the laissez-faire and government-imposed price stabilization 
counterfactuals, a stylized price risk compensation scheme to fully compensate 
households who incur a welfare loss from price fluctuations, but which offers nothing to 
households who gain from price fluctuations. Although our previous results clearly 
indicate that such a policy would be distributionally regressive, as would any price 
stabilization policy, such a scheme merits consideration as an alternative to full-blown 
price stabilization if political pressure, perhaps from economic élites, effectively compels 
the state to act in some fashion so as to reduce food price volatility.  
 
We begin by considering the effects of full price stabilization, i.e., a policy in which 
households who gain from price fluctuations are, in effect, fully taxed for their gains 
while households who lose out from price fluctuations are, de facto, fully compensated 
for their losses. This represents the naïve benchmark of pure price stabilization, ignoring 
(likely important) general equilibrium effects (Acemoglu, 2010). Table 9a characterizes 
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the (in-sample) winners and losers from such a policy. Under an assumed relative risk 
aversion R = 2, in this Ethiopian sample, those who would lose out from price 
stabilization vastly outnumber those who would gain (5216 versus 3060 households). But 
those who would lose out would incur a welfare loss from price stabilization that is on 
average much smaller than magnitude than the welfare gain of those who would benefit 
from nonstochastic prices (53 birr versus 660 birr). This echoes the point made in the 
previous section about the logic of collective action among a relatively small number of 
big winners, even when a majority would lose out from the policy (Olson 1965). 
 
Table 9b then compares the social welfare changes for two policy options, as 
measured against a laissez-faire policy under which nothing is done about commodity 
price volatility.27 The first intervention option is the pure price stabilization policy 
discussed above (column 5). Column (6) reflects a compromise option, a price risk 
compensation scheme in which those households who are price risk-averse receive full 
compensation for their exposure to price fluctuations but in which those households who 
are price risk-neutral and price risk-loving are unaffected. As shown, the change in social 
welfare is highest under a price risk compensation scheme, with the pure price 
stabilization policy falling between laissez-faire and price risk compensation. Moreover, 
only the price risk compensation is Pareto-improving, precisely because it leaves price 
risk-neutral and price risk-loving households unaffected. By contrast, pure price 
stabilization would make a majority of households worse off, even though average 
welfare gains are positive because the average gains to the price risk-averse 
subpopulation are more than an order of magnitude greater than the average losses to the 
price risk-loving subpopulation.  
 
While this is just a highly stylized example, it serves to underscore how the 
heterogeneous welfare effects of food price risk exposure may require more nuanced and 
creative policy responses than are commonly mooted in current popular discussions. This 
is an area ripe for further research using more realistic general equilibrium models that 
                                                 
27
 This highly stylized analysis ignores fiscal costs and general equilibrium effects, both of which cannot be 
quantified with the data at hand. 
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take into full consideration the distortionary effects of tax policies necessary to raise the 
resources for compensatory payments. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has modestly extended microeconomic theory so as to allow applied 
economists to study price risk aversion over multiple commodities. Specifically, we first 
derived a matrix measuring the curvature of the indirect utility function in the hyperspace 
defined by the prices faced by agricultural households. The elements of this matrix 
describe own- and cross-price risk aversion, which respectively relate to the direct 
impacts of a price’s volatility (i.e., the variance of the price of each commodity) as well 
as its indirect impacts through other prices (i.e., the covariance between the prices of all 
commodities) on household welfare. We have also shown how testing for the symmetry 
of the matrix of price risk aversion coefficients is equivalent to testing the symmetry of 
the Slutsky matrix, although the former imposes less structure on the data than the latter 
and is in principle more likely not to be rejected.  
 
In the empirical portion of the paper, we estimate the matrix of price risk aversion 
coefficients using well-known survey data on a panel of rural Ethiopian households. We 
find that these households are on average significantly price risk-averse over the prices of 
specific commodities as well as over cofluctuations in the prices of the same 
commodities. Although we statistically reject the hypothesis that of symmetry in the 
matrix of price risk aversion, the estimated differences are economically insignificant, 
lending weak support to the underlying theory. The contrast between the statistical and 
economic results is likely due to the precision with which we estimate the coefficients in 
the matrix of price risk aversion.  
 
More importantly, the average household’s willingness to pay to fully stabilize 
commodity prices at their means lies between 6 to 32 percent of household income, 
depending on one’s assumption about Arrow-Pratt relative income risk aversion. This 
may very well explain governments’ frequent interest in price stabilization: on average, 
households stand to benefit from it. Nonparametric analysis of household-specific WTP 
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estimates, however, suggests that the welfare gains from stabilizing prices at their means 
would accrue to households in the upper half of the income distribution and that a 
significant proportion of the households in the bottom half of the income distribution 
would actually be hurt by price stabilization, suggesting a distributionally regressive 
benefit incidence from price stabilization policy.  
 
Finally, if and when the political economy of price stabilization compels a 
government to intervene to attenuate the impacts of commodity price volatility, we 
suggest a price risk compensation alternative to outright price stabilization. Holding 
administrative costs constant and ignoring general equilibrium effects, we demonstrate in 
a very simplistic illustration that a compensation scheme without market interventions 
might prove Pareto-superior to pure price stabilization, albeit still distributionally 
regressive. Given the high-level of renewed interest in this topic, the complex and 
heterogeneous welfare effects of multivariate commodity price volatility appears a topic 
that merits further exploration. 
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Figure 1: Fractional polynomial regression of household WTP to eliminate price 
fluctuations among seven staple commodities on household income for households 
whose seasonal income does not exceed 10,000 birr. 
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 Table 1: Seasonal Descriptive Statistics for Crop Marketable Surplus (Full Sample, all in kg) 
Crop Mean (Std. Dev.) Nonzero Observations 
Coffee  -13.36 (87.37) 6744 
Maize  -121.57 (364.54) 3966 
Beans  -40.39 (95.63) 3030 
Barley  -88.76 (367.04) 2825 
Wheat  -64.82 (279.28) 2796 
Teff  -100.92 (335.37) 2666 
Sorghum  -38.82 (204.00) 1712 
N=8556 
 
 
Table 2: Seasonal Descriptive Statistics for Crop Marketable Surplus (Nonzero Observations) 
Crop Net Buyer 
Mean 
Marketable 
Surplus 
(kg) 
(Std. Dev.) Net Buyer 
Observations 
Net Seller 
Mean 
Marketable 
Surplus 
(kg) 
(Std. Dev.) Net Seller 
Observations 
Coffee  -23.44 (95.64) 6206 57.92 (95.02) 538 
Maize -397.18 (438.32) 3115 231.55 (388.10) 851 
Beans -127.14 (122.91) 2848 90.70 (95.32) 182 
Barley -459.27 (553.31) 2097 279.81 (329.47) 728 
Wheat  -296.70 (337.00) 2420 434.74 (620.52) 376 
Teff  -471.03 (453.10) 2136 269.06 (432.08) 530 
Sorghum  -349.56 (320.29) 1313 317.96 (290.27) 399 
 
 
 Table 3: Seasonal Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables (n=8556) 
Crop Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Real Commodity Prices   
Coffee (Birr/Kg) 13.32 (5.20) 
Maize (Birr/Kg) 1.29 (0.38) 
Beans (Birr/Kg) 1.88 (0.43) 
Barley (Birr/Kg) 1.50 (0.41) 
Wheat (Birr/Kg) 1.74 (0.33) 
Teff (Birr/Kg) 2.28 (0.40) 
Sorghum (Birr/Kg) 1.52 (0.42) 
Potatoes (Birr/Kg) 1.52 (0.74) 
Onions (Birr/Kg) 1.97 (0.78) 
Cabbage (Birr/Kg) 0.92 (0.68) 
Milk (Birr/Liter) 2.09 (0.88) 
Tella (Birr/Liter) 0.69 (0.25) 
Sugar (Birr/Kg) 5.85 (2.08) 
Salt (Birr/Kg) 1.70 (1.02) 
Cooking Oil (Birr/Liter) 9.14 (2.60) 
   
Income   
Income (Birr) 886.17 (9869.70) 
Nonzero Income (Birr) 1087.35 (10922.88) 
   
Budget Shares   
Budget Share of Coffee -0.15 (1.05) 
Budget Share of Maize -0.13 (0.40) 
Budget Share of Beans -0.07 (0.16) 
Budget Share of Barley -0.12 (0.52) 
Budget Share of Wheat -0.11 (0.43) 
Budget Share of Teff -0.21 (0.69) 
Budget Share of Sorghum -0.06 (0.33) 
Note: Income (i.e., the sum of off-farm income, all crop 
revenues, and livestock sales) was different from zero for 
only 6973 observations, so budget shares are computed for 
that sub-sample. Because of the presence of zero incomes, 
budget shares were obtained by dividing marketable 
surpluses by mean nonzero income. 
 
 
Table 4: Seasonal Variance-Covariance Matrix of Commodity Prices 
 
 Coffee Maize Beans Barley Wheat Teff Sorghum 
Coffee 27.05       
Maize 0.46 0.15      
Beans 0.25 0.05 0.19     
Barley 0.29 0.03 -0.04 0.17    
Wheat 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.11   
Teff 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.16  
Sorghum 0.18 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.17 
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Table 5: Seasonal Marketable Surplus Equation Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: 
(1) 
Coffee Marketable Surplus  
(2) 
Maize Marketable Surplus  
(3) 
Beans Marketable Surplus  
(4) 
Barley Marketable Surplus 
Coefficients Coeff. Est. (Std. Err.) Coeff. Est. (Std. Err.) Coeff. Est. (Std. Err.) Coeff. Est. (Std. Err.) 
Coffee Price 40.273*** (0.092) 96.297*** (0.688) 15.471*** (0.051) -178.545*** (0.500) 
Maize Price -6.344 (3.703) 389.529*** (27.526) 36.811*** (2.043) 118.277*** (20.027) 
Beans Price -9.567* (5.359) -115.378** (39.841) 39.952*** (2.957) 257.049*** (28.988) 
Barley Price -27.499*** (3.585) -53.697* (26.648) 7.396*** (1.978) 305.961*** (19.389) 
Wheat Price 30.689*** (5.884) 137.883*** (43.738) 146.613*** (3.246) 254.879*** (31.823) 
Teff Price 104.537*** (7.905) -66.515 (58.761) -94.449*** (4.361) -326.964*** (42.754) 
Sorghum Price -68.434*** (2.637) -73.385*** (19.603) -95.320*** (1.455) -445.863*** (14.263) 
Potatoes Price 12.659*** (1.007) 7.845 (7.488) 26.723*** (0.556) 37.081*** (5.448) 
Onions Price -24.624*** (3.258) 59.407** (24.220) -51.082*** (1.798) -275.690*** (17.622) 
Cabbage Price -10.344*** (0.563) 52.844*** (4.182) 5.462*** (0.310) 73.095*** (3.043) 
Milk Price -13.161*** (1.182) 290.977*** (8.790) -26.748*** (0.652) 18.605** (6.395) 
Tella Price 28.556*** (4.217) 131.295*** (31.345) 75.795*** (2.326) 307.160*** (22.806) 
Sugar Price 11.445*** (3.310) -151.995*** (24.602) 5.659*** (1.826) 21.166 (17.901) 
Salt Price 6.754*** (1.944) 121.660*** (14.449) -36.798*** (1.072) -264.330*** (10.513) 
Cooking Oil Price -5.634** (2.350) -15.989 (17.470) -91.614*** (1.297) -362.422*** (12.711) 
Income 0.721 (0.499) 7.242* (3.708) 0.302 (0.275) 6.861** (2.698) 
Intercept -151.799*** (15.180) -304.647** (112.841) 187.358*** (8.374) 1448.533*** (82.102) 
N 8556 8556 8556 8556 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.33 0.44 0.44 0.37 
Household FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Woreda-Round FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels. Bolded coefficients and standard errors are for own-price effects. 
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Table 5 (continued): Seasonal Marketable Surplus Equation Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: 
(5) 
Wheat Marketable Surplus 
(6) 
Teff Marketable Surplus 
(7) 
Sorghum Marketable Surplus 
Variable Coeff. Est. (Std. Err.) Coeff. Est. (Std. Err.) Coeff. Est. (Std. Err.) 
Coffee Price 2.688*** (0.290) 113.406*** (0.632) 22.879*** (0.369) 
Maize Price -85.971*** (11.603) 48.316* (25.306) -36.271** (14.774) 
Beans Price -35.692** (16.795) -63.054 (36.628) -68.184*** (21.383) 
Barley Price -46.119*** (11.234) -58.085** (24.499) 50.331*** (14.303) 
Wheat Price 17.469 (18.438) 38.188** (40.211) -144.397*** (23.475) 
Teff Price 235.372*** (24.771) 123.266** (54.022) 84.194** (31.538) 
Sorghum Price -45.547*** (8.263) 3.172 (18.022) 39.693*** (10.521) 
Potatoes Price 31.551*** (3.157) 10.700 (6.884) -34.192*** (4.019) 
Onions Price -64.140*** (10.210) 103.915*** (22.267) 61.417*** (12.999) 
Cabbage Price 21.528*** (1.763) 29.668*** (3.845) 8.517*** (2.244) 
Milk Price -134.989*** (3.705) 111.745*** (8.081) 25.431*** (4.718) 
Tella Price 106.587*** (13.213) -0.722 (28.817) -80.962*** (16.823) 
Sugar Price 43.907*** (10.371) -175.316*** (22.619) -22.747 (13.205) 
Salt Price -3.396 (6.091) 140.199*** (13.284) 8.750 (7.755) 
Cooking Oil Price 8.577 (7.364) 12.020 (16.061) 75.466*** (9.376) 
Income 0.626 (1.563) 4.950 (3.409) 2.861 (1.990) 
Intercept -130.943** (47.568) -396.577*** (103.741) -300.241*** (60.564) 
N 8556 8556 8556 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 0.02 
R2 0.39 0.45 0.37 
Household FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Woreda-Round FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels. Bolded coefficients and standard errors are for own-price 
effects. 
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Table 6a: Estimated Matrix of Price Risk Aversion for Relative Risk Aversion R = 2 
 Coffee Maize Beans Barley Wheat Teff Sorghum 
Coffee 18.148*** 
(5.229) 
10.091*** 
(1.983) 
3.427*** 
(0.663) 
17.293*** 
(2.758) 
6.894*** 
(0.997) 
11.056*** 
(1.879) 
2.510*** 
(0.783) 
Maize 10.063*** 
(1.978) 
620.421*** 
(72.300) 
15.567*** 
(2.035) 
58.287*** 
(12.732) 
45.306*** 
(11.961) 
134.083*** 
(24.918) 
22.676*** 
(6.237) 
Beans 3.507*** 
(0.679) 
15.969*** 
(2.088) 
51.661*** 
(4.387) 
96.571*** 
(10.278) 
42.830*** 
(6.383) 
57.995*** 
(6.444) 
10.821*** 
(1.952) 
Barley 17.098*** 
(2.727) 
57.788*** 
(12.624) 
93.324*** 
(9.933) 
893.913*** 
(101.013) 
125.214*** 
(17.033) 
112.650*** 
(19.065) 
28.062*** 
(8.739) 
Wheat 7.046*** 
(1.019) 
46.433*** 
(12.258) 
42.785*** 
(6.376) 
129.431*** 
(17.606) 
275.618*** 
(60.152) 
136.169*** 
(26.187) 
16.764*** 
(4.529) 
Teff 11.083*** 
(1.883) 
134.770*** 
(25.046) 
56.819*** 
(6.314) 
114.203*** 
(19.327) 
133.552*** 
(25.684) 
514.857*** 
(58.887) 
28.438*** 
(4.839) 
Sorghum 2.486*** 
(0.776) 
22.521*** 
(6.194) 
10.476*** 
(1.889) 
28.108*** 
(8.754) 
16.246*** 
(4.389) 
28.099*** 
(4.781) 
94.009*** 
(13.201) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent 
levels. Bolded coefficients are own-price risk aversion coefficients. 
 
 
 
Table 6b: Tests of Symmetry of the Matrix of Price Risk Aversion for Relative Risk Aversion R = 2 
Sub-Matrix Test Statistic p-value 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A3 (Coffee, …, Beans) F(3, 8553) = 24.48 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A4 (Coffee, …, Barley) F(6, 8550) = 26.53 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A5 (Coffee, …, Wheat) F(9, 8547) = 22.33 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A6 (Coffee, …, Teff) F(14, 8542) = 16.59 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A7 (Coffee, …, Sorghum) F(27, 8529) = 13.61 0.00 
Joint Significance (All Coefficients) F(29, 8527) = 18.62 0.00 
Joint Significance (Diagonal Coefficients) F(7, 8549) = 47.52  0.00 
Joint Significance (Off-Diagonal Coefficients) F(22, 8534) = 22.85 0.00 
Note: Constraints were dropped due to collinearity in every test. 
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Table 7a: Estimated WTP as Proportion of Household Income (Rows)  
 R = 1 R = 2 R = 3 
Commodity WTP (Std. Err) WTP (Std. Err) WTP (Std. Err) 
Coffee 0.052*** (0.019) 0.142*** (0.039) 0.231*** (0.060) 
Maize -0.013*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Beans -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Barley 0.005*** (0.001) 0.016*** (0.001) 0.027*** (0.002) 
Wheat 0.005*** (0.000) 0.010*** (0.001) 0.016*** (0.001) 
Teff 0.007*** (0.000) 0.016*** (0.001) 0.026*** (0.001) 
Sorghum 0.003*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.000) 0.010*** (0.001) 
All Commodities 0.056*** (0.019) 0.187*** (0.040) 0.318*** (0.060) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 
percent levels. 
 
 
 
Table 7b: Estimated WTP as Proportion of Household Income (Columns)  
 R = 1 R = 2 R = 3 
Commodity R = 1 (Std. Err) R = 2 (Std. Err) R = 3 (Std. Err) 
Coffee 0.045** (0.019) 0.134*** (0.039) 0.224*** (0.059) 
Maize -0.014*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Beans 0.005*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.000) 
Barley -0.002*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) 0.021*** (0.002) 
Wheat -0.001*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.001) 
Teff 0.008*** (0.000) 0.018*** (0.001) 0.028*** (0.001) 
Sorghum 0.015*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) 
All Commodities 0.056*** (0.019) 0.187*** (0.040) 0.318*** (0.060) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 
percent levels. 
 
 
 
Table 7c: Estimated WTP as Proportion of Household Income Ignoring Covariances  
 R = 1 R = 2 R = 3 
Commodity R = 1 (Std. Err) R = 2 (Std. Err) R = 3 (Std. Err) 
Coffee 0.045** (0.019) 0.133*** (0.039) 0.222*** (0.059) 
Maize -0.015*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 
Beans -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 
Barley -0.007*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.001) 
Wheat 0.003*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001) 
Teff 0.005*** (0.000) 0.013*** (0.001) 0.021*** (0.001) 
Sorghum 0.001*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.000) 
All Commodities 0.030 (0.019) 0.154*** (0.039) 0.278*** (0.059) 
Note: These measures are derived following Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1997). Standard errors are in 
parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels. 
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Table 8: Estimated WTP for Price Risk Stabilization, By Income Range 
Income Range (Birr) Income Percentile Range Sign of Fitted WTP 
0.00 - 3.24 0.00 - 18.84 0 
3.24 - 267.66 18.84 - 49.82 - 
267.66 - 441.92 49.82 - 61.49 0 
441.92 - 10,000.00 61.49 - 100.00 + 
 Note: These numbers reflect the regression plotted in figure 1. A negative sign in the 
third column means that households in this interval are statistically significantly price 
risk-loving; a 0 means that households in this interval have no statistically significant 
preference for or against price variability; and a positive sign means that households in 
this interval are statistically significantly price risk-averse.   
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Table 9a: Estimated Welfare Gains and Losses from Eliminating Price Fluctuations 
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) 
of Relative Average Welfare Gain Number of Households Average Welfare Loss Number of Households 
Risk Aversion (Birr) Who Would Benefit (Birr) Who Would Lose Out 
R = 1 439.37 2134 67.23 6142 
R = 2 660.41 3060 52.96 5216 
R = 3 836.28 3778 43.35 4498 
 Note: The average welfare gains and losses are derived from the “All Commodities” estimates in tables 7a and 7b and reflect the 
effect on household welfare of completely eliminating price fluctuations, i.e., keeping the prices of coffee, maize, beans, barley, 
wheat, teff, and sorghum fixed at their means. 
 
 
 
Table 9b: Ex Ante Marginal Changes in Social Welfare under Three Policy Scenarios 
Coefficient (5) (6) 
of Relative Change in Social Welfare Change in Social Welfare 
Risk Aversion under Price Stabilization under Compensation 
  (1) x (2) - (3) x (4) (1) x (2) 
R = 1 524,689 937,616 
R = 2 1,744,615 2,020,855 
R = 3 2,964,478 3,159,466 
Note: Values in columns 5 to 7 are expressed in Ethiopian birr. Column 5 describes the change in social welfare under 
no policy. Column 6 describes the change in social welfare under a price stabilization policy, i.e., a policy in which 
prices are kept equal to their means and do not fluctuate, i.e., the product of columns 1 and 2 minus the product of 
columns 3 and 4. Column 7 describes the change in social welfare under a price risk compensation policy, i.e., a policy 
in which prices fluctuate but transfers are made to compensate those who suffer from price risk, i.e., the product of 
columns 1 and 2. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1a: Estimated Matrix of Price Risk Aversion for Relative Risk Aversion R = 1 
 
 Coffee Maize Beans Barley Wheat Teff Sorghum 
Coffee 4.657*** 
(1.342) 
2.596*** 
(0.510) 
0.860*** 
(0.166) 
4.484*** 
(0.715) 
1.732*** 
(0.250) 
2.830*** 
(0.481) 
0.650*** 
(0.203) 
Maize 2.582*** 
(0.507) 
159.592*** 
(18.598) 
3.907*** 
(0.511) 
15.115*** 
(3.302) 
11.381*** 
(3.005) 
34.324*** 
(6.379) 
5.871*** 
(1.615) 
Beans 0.900*** 
(0.174) 
4.108*** 
(0.537) 
12.964*** 
(1.101) 
25.043*** 
(2.665) 
10.759*** 
(1.603) 
14.847*** 
(1.650) 
2.802*** 
(0.505) 
Barley 4.387*** 
(0700) 
14.865*** 
(3.247) 
23.418*** 
(2.492) 
231.808*** 
(26.193) 
31.455*** 
(4.279) 
28.840*** 
(4.880) 
7.267*** 
(2.263) 
Wheat 1.808*** 
(0.261) 
11.945*** 
(3.153) 
10.737*** 
(1.600) 
33.564*** 
(4.565) 
69.239*** 
(15.110) 
34.858*** 
(6.703) 
4.340*** 
(1.173) 
Teff 2.843*** 
(0.483) 
34.667*** 
(6.443) 
14.259*** 
(1.584) 
29.616*** 
(5.012) 
33.549*** 
(6.452) 
131.799*** 
(15.074) 
7.362*** 
(1.253) 
Sorghum 0.638*** 
(0.199) 
5.794*** 
(1.593) 
2.629*** 
(0.474) 
7.288*** 
(2.270) 
4.082*** 
(1.103) 
7.193*** 
(1.224) 
24.339*** 
(3.418) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
90, 95, and 99 percent levels. Bolded coefficients are own-price risk aversion 
coefficients. 
 
Table A1b: Tests of Symmetry of the Matrix of Price Risk Aversion for Relative Risk Aversion R = 1 
Sub-Matrix Test Statistic p-value 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A3 (Coffee, …, Beans) F(3, 8553) = 24.44 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A4 (Coffee, …, Barley) F(6, 8550) = 26.55 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A5 (Coffee, …, Wheat) F(9, 8547) = 22.24 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A6 (Coffee, …, Teff) F(14, 8542) = 16.58 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A7 (Coffee, …, Sorghum) F(20, 8536) = 13.65 0.00 
Joint Significance (All Coefficients) F(33, 8523) = 88.54 0.00 
Joint Significance (Diagonal Coefficients) F(7, 8549) = 47.52  0.00 
Joint Significance (Off-Diagonal Coefficients) F(26, 8530) = 110.23 0.00 
Note: Constraints were dropped due to collinearity in every test. 
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Table A2a: Estimated Matrix of Price Risk Aversion for Relative Risk Aversion R = 3 
 
 Coffee Maize Beans Barley Wheat Teff Sorghum 
Coffee 13.493*** 
(3.887) 
7.496*** 
(1.473) 
2.567*** 
(0.497) 
12.809*** 
(2.043) 
5.162*** 
(0.746) 
8.226*** 
(1.398) 
1.860*** 
(0.581) 
Maize 7.482*** 
(1.470) 
460.839*** 
(53.702) 
11.661*** 
(1.524) 
43.174*** 
(9.431) 
33.926*** 
(8.956) 
99.761*** 
(18.539) 
16.806*** 
(4.622) 
Beans 2.607*** 
(0.505) 
11.862*** 
(1.551) 
38.699*** 
(3.286) 
71.534*** 
(7.613) 
32.072*** 
(4.779) 
43.151*** 
(4.795) 
8.020*** 
(1.446) 
Barley 12.712*** 
(2.027) 
42.924*** 
(9.376) 
69.909*** 
(7.440) 
662.159*** 
(74.820) 
93.766*** 
(12.754) 
83.822*** 
(14.184) 
20.798*** 
(6.477) 
Wheat 5.239*** 
(0.757) 
34.490*** 
(9.105) 
32.050*** 
(4.776) 
95.875*** 
(13.041) 
206.392*** 
(45.042) 
101.315*** 
(19.484) 
12.424*** 
(3.357) 
Teff 8.240*** 
(1.400) 
100.104*** 
(18.603) 
42.563*** 
(4.729) 
84.598*** 
(14.316) 
100.007*** 
(19.232) 
383.074*** 
(43.813) 
21.077*** 
(3.586) 
Sorghum 1.848*** 
(0.577) 
16.729*** 
(4.601) 
7.847*** 
(1.415) 
20.819*** 
(6.484) 
12.166*** 
(3.287) 
20.907*** 
(3.557) 
69.675*** 
(9.783) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 
percent levels. Bolded coefficients are own-price risk aversion coefficients. 
 
Table A2b: Tests of Symmetry of the Matrix of Price Risk Aversion for Relative Risk Aversion R = 3 
Sub-Matrix Test Statistic p-value 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A3 (Coffee, …, Beans) F(3, 8553) = 24.44 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A4 (Coffee, …, Barley) F(6, 8550) = 26.55 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A5 (Coffee, …, Wheat) F(9, 8547) = 22.24 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A6 (Coffee, …, Teff) F(14, 8542) = 16.58 0.00 
Symmetry of Sub-Matrix A7 (Coffee, …, Sorghum) F(20, 8536) = 13.65 0.00 
Joint Significance (All Coefficients) F(29, 8527) = 18.61 0.00 
Joint Significance (Diagonal Coefficients) F(7, 8549) = 47.52  0.00 
Joint Significance (Off-Diagonal Coefficients) F(22, 8534) = 18.38 0.00 
Note: Constraints were dropped due to collinearity in every test. 
 
